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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1285 
 ___________ 
 
 DARRIN ROBINSON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 PHILIP JOHNSON; JEFFREY FORTE; DANIEL HOOPER; MARTIN HORN; 
JOSEPH ESSEDY (or ECSEDY); ROBERT ONSTOTT, in their individual capacities 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 03-cv-01545) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  October 28, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Darrin Robinson, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a judgment 
entered in favor of Martin Horn, former Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections, and Philip Johnson, former Superintendent of 
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SCI-Pittsburgh, after a bench trial in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Robinson, through counsel, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Secretary Horn, Superintendent Johnson, and several corrections officers claiming a 
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights arising from an attack by another inmate which 
resulted in serious injuries.  The parties consented to adjudication by a Magistrate Judge, 
who granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants.  On appeal, we reversed 
the Magistrate Judge’s decision that Robinson had procedurally defaulted his claims 
against Secretary Horn and Superintendent Johnson.  See Robinson v. Johnson, 343 F. 
App’x 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision).   
Robinson’s claims against Johnson and Horn proceeded to a two-day bench trial 
after which the Magistrate Judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
Magistrate Judge found that on June 26, 2002, Robinson, who was housed in the 
Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), was placed in a fenced exercise yard, also referred to 
as an exercise cage, with three other inmates.  All four inmates wore handcuffs, which 
would be removed while they exercised.  Inmate Troy Cooper’s handcuffs were removed 
first.  As soon as his cuffs were removed, Cooper attacked Robinson, who was still 
cuffed, with a sharp piece of plastic, which Cooper had smuggled into the yard.  
Robinson suffered wounds to his face, head, hands, and knee, which required 
hospitalization and minor surgery.  Robinson testified that he had no idea that Cooper 
was a threat to him.  He and Cooper had exercised in the same cage before. 
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The Magistrate Judge found that Secretary Horn was responsible for the day-to-
day oversight of the Pennsylvania prison system and for approving department-wide 
policies.  Under Department of Corrections Policy 6.5.1, RHU inmates are to exercise 
one person per yard, but two inmates may be placed in a yard when there is inadequate 
space to accommodate the demand for exercise.  Horn was Secretary when Policy 6.5.1. 
was implemented, but was no longer Secretary on the date of the incident at issue. 
The Magistrate Judge also found that SCI-Pittsburgh routinely exercised up to four 
RHU inmates in a single yard and up to five inmates in a larger center yard.  Had SCI-
Pittsburgh exercised one person per cage, RHU staff would not have been unable to do 
anything else during the day other than exercise the inmates.
1
  Corrections officers search 
the exercise cages for contraband and conduct visual strip searches of RHU inmates 
before they are escorted to the cages to exercise.  The officers remove inmates’ handcuffs 
one at a time through an aperture in the fence.  For a brief period of time, an inmate 
wearing handcuffs is exposed to an inmate without handcuffs.  There was evidence of 
twelve alleged or actual altercations in RHU exercise yards from January 2001 to June 
2002, one of which involved an uncuffed inmate attacking a cuffed inmate.  Johnson 
testified there were about ten fights between uncuffed inmates in RHU exercise yards 
from 1995 to 2002, when he was Superintendent at SCI-Pittsburgh and two other prisons.  
                                                 
1
Superintendent Johnson testified that approval must have been obtained from the 
Department of Corrections’ central office for the practice of placing more than two RHU 
inmates in an exercise yard.  The Magistrate Judge found, and the record reflects, that 
there was no evidence presented establishing such approval.  
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In rejecting Robinson’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
that Robinson failed to show that Horn and Johnson acted with deliberate indifference to 
his safety when they approved and/or implemented Policy 6.5.1, which resulted in cuffed 
and uncuffed inmates commingling briefly inside the RHU exercise yards.  The 
Magistrate Judge explained that there were an insufficient number of attacks to prove 
knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm.  The Magistrate Judge also noted that the 
staff searches the exercise cages and RHU inmates for contraband and that Robinson, 
who had been in and out of the RHU over his twenty-year period of incarceration, had 
not been previously exposed to danger.  The Magistrate Judge further concluded that 
Robinson had not established an obvious risk of harm and stated that intermingling 
cuffed and uncuffed inmates in various settings is a fact of prison life.  This appeal 
followed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When a district court conducts 
a non-jury trial, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and exercise 
plenary review over its application of the law to the facts.  Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator 
Industry Pension, Health Benefit and Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
Robinson first argues in his brief that his counsel made various errors during the 
course of his representation.  Robinson contends that he told his attorney that he wanted a 
jury trial but his attorney arranged for a bench trial without his consent.  He also states 
that his attorney failed to call three guards to testify.  Robinson is also unhappy his case 
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was handled by several lawyers and he believes they “made a mockery” of his case.  
Robinson seeks a new trial before a jury.   
Unlike a criminal defendant, a civil litigant does not have a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 
(3d Cir. 1980).  The proper remedy for defective representation in a civil action is not a 
new trial but a malpractice action against the offending attorney.  Stanciel v. Gramley, 
267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001); Kushner, 620 F.2d at 408.  Robinson’s dissatisfaction 
with counsel’s representation does not provide a basis for a new trial.  In addition, 
Robinson’s participation without objection in the bench trial waives any Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 723, 727 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
Robinson also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that Horn and Johnson were aware of a substantial risk 
of harm.  He asserts that it is undisputed that RHU inmates are highly assaultive, that 
inmates requiring protection exercise with violent inmates, that a handcuffed inmate 
could not defend himself if attacked, that eleven exercise cage assaults had been 
documented in the two years before he was attacked, that Horn and Johnson agreed there 
is a potential for trouble when an uncuffed inmate is in the presence of a cuffed inmate, 
and that SCI-Pittsburgh exercised up to five RHU inmates together.  Robinson argues that 
the assaults were regular and predictable and that Horn and Johnson cannot escape 
liability because they were unaware that he was likely to be assaulted. 
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Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other 
inmates.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).  As recognized by the Magistrate 
Judge, in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Robinson was required to 
show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm 
and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that risk.  Id. at 834.  Deliberate 
indifference requires that a prison official know of and disregard an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety.  Id. at 837.   
Whether an official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question 
of fact, which may be shown by circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 842.  Evidence showing 
that a risk was obvious may be sufficient to show actual knowledge.  Id.  Evidence, for 
example, showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was pervasive or well-
documented and that officials had been exposed to information about the risk may be 
sufficient.  Id. at 842-43.  As Robinson asserts, an official may not escape liability by 
showing that, while he was aware of a substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know 
the complainant was likely to be assaulted.  Id. at 843.  Finally, an official’s duty under 
the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety” and, even if an official is aware 
of a substantial risk to inmate safety, an official may not be liable if he responded 
reasonably to the risk.  Id. at 844. 
Applying these principles, we find no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion 
that Robinson failed to establish that Horn and Johnson were deliberately indifferent to a 
substantial risk of harm.  It is undisputed that Robinson did not expect any harm from 
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Cooper.  The evidence does not establish that Horn or Johnson was exposed to 
information indicating that either the prison policy or SCI-Pittsburgh’s practice regarding 
RHU exercise, which allowed more than one inmate in an exercise yard and resulted in a 
cuffed inmate being exposed briefly to an uncuffed inmate, posed a substantial risk of 
harm.  The number of fights that occurred in RHU exercise yards was small.  Johnson 
described such occurrences as “pretty rare,” noting that “most of the time the guys 
wanted to exercise together.”  6/7/10 Trial Trans. at 157.  Horn and Johnson also testified 
that no one had ever raised concerns during staff meetings or visits to the RHU regarding 
the practice of having cuffed inmates exposed to uncuffed inmates in the exercise yards. 
Robinson correctly states in his brief that a claimant need not show a particular 
number of incidents before a claim of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm 
is successful.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at  845 (noting availability of injunctive relief to 
remedy unsafe conditions).  At trial, Robinson sought to show that Horn and Johnson 
knew that a substantial risk of harm existed when a cuffed inmate was exposed to an 
uncuffed inmate in the exercise yard because the risk was obvious.  Steven Martin, 
Robinson’s expert witness on management of maximum security prisons, testified that 
commingling cuffed and uncuffed inmates in the RHU exercise space makes the cuffed 
inmate vulnerable and creates a condition that a potential attacker will exploit.  Martin 
further testified that a policymaker would be aware of this risk.  Martin, however, also 
testified that he had often seen commingling in the maximum security setting, typically 
when a cuffed inmate is escorted across an open yard with unrestrained inmates.  Both 
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Horn and Johnson also testified, and Martin agreed, that commingling cuffed and 
uncuffed inmates occurs in other circumstances, such as when a double-celled RHU 
inmate must leave his cell and he is cuffed in the presence of an uncuffed cellmate.  The 
record thus supports the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that such commingling is a fact of 
prison life. 
The record does not reflect that either Horn or Johnson perceived the brief period 
when a cuffed inmate is exposed to an uncuffed inmate in the exercise yard as presenting 
a substantial risk of harm.  As noted by the Magistrate Judge, staff also took measures to 
minimize any risk of harm by searching the exercise yards and the RHU inmates.  Based 
on the evidence submitted at trial, we cannot conclude that either defendant was 
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
